Modal logics for reasoning about the power of coalitions capture the notion of effectivity functions associated with game forms. The main goal of coalition logics is to provide formal tools for modeling the dynamics of a game frame whose states may correspond to different game forms. The two classes of effectivity functions studied are the families of playable and truly playable effectivity functions, respectively. In this paper we generalize the concept of effectivity function beyond the yes/no truth scale. This enables us to describe the situations in which the goals of players are evaluated by utility functions on states. Then we introduce two modal extensions of Łukasiewicz (n + 1)-valued logic together with many-valued neighborhood semantics in order to encode the properties of many-valued effectivity functions associated with game forms. As our main results we prove completeness theorems for the two newly introduced modal logics.
Introduction
Modeling collective actions of agents and capturing their effectivity is among the important research topics on the frontiers of game theory, computer science and mathematical logic. The main efforts are concentrated on answering the following question: what is the set of outcome states that can effectively be implemented by a coalition of agents? A game-theoretic framework for studying collective actions and their enforceability is based on the notion of game forms. Loosely speaking, a game form is a pure description of a game and its rules, without regard to the agents' preferences. The game frames enable us to capture a more general action model in which a game form is associated with every state of the frame and the outcome states of the game forms are the states of the frame. From the gametheoretic viewpoint, the game frames are extensive form games with simultaneous moves of the players; see [17, 22] .
The concept of α-effectivity ( [1, 20] ) is one of the key approaches to characterize the coalitional effectivity within game form models. A coalition C is α-effective for a set of outcome states X if the players in C can choose a joint strategy that enforces the outcome in X no matter what strategies are adopted by the other players. The previous definition gives rise to the concept of a (truly) playable effectivity function. In his seminal paper [19] , Pauly introduces Coalition Logic CL N to reason about α-effectivity in game forms with player set N . The axiomatization of CL N is an attempt at a characterization of the class of α-effectivity functions in a multi-modal language. Pauly also defined a neighborhood semantics with respect to which CL N is complete. The logic CL N was subsequently analyzed and extended by many authors see [2, 5] . Namely Goranko et al. [9] found a gap in Pauly's characterization of playable effectivity functions (see [19, Theorem Key words and phrases. Coalition Logic, Łukasiewicz modal logic, effectivity function, game form.
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3.2])
, which led to the introduction of truly playable effectivity functions. 1 The reader is invited to consult Appendix A in which we recall all the necessary notions regarding Boolean effectivity functions and the distinction between playable and truly playable functions, respectively.
In this paper we extend the results of Pauly [19] and Goranko et al. [9] to the situations in which the effectivity of coalitions is evaluated on a finer finite scale than {0, 1}. Our main goal is to investigate the properties of many-valued modal logics P n and TP n devised for reasoning about the refined notion of effectivity. To this end, we proceed as follows. In Section 2 we generalize the notion of α-effectivity. Since we use finitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic, our scale is always the set Ł n = 0, 1 n , . . . , n−1 n , 1 , where n is a positive integer. Thus we introduce the concept of Ł n -valued effectivity function whose purpose is to capture the effectivity of coalitions in those settings where goals are evaluated by utility functions. The motivation for this generalization is illustrated with examples: we show how to model the degree of satisfaction of agents' goals in a strategic game (Example 2.5). The properties of (true) playability of Ł n -valued effectivity functions, which are crucial for understanding the relation effectivity functions to game forms, are analyzed in Section 3. In particular, we establish the characterization of truly playable Ł n -valued effectivity functions (Theorem 3.9). In Section 4, we develop the tools to capture the properties of Ł n -valued effectivity functions in a many-valued modal language. These developments rely not only on the recent advances in modal extensions of Łukasiewicz logic (see [6, 12] ), but they also require the introduction of neighborhood semantics, which has never been considered in the modal manyvalued setting before, to the best of our knowledge. The newly introduced logics P n and TP n axiomatize in the many-valued modal language the properties of playable and truly playable Ł n -valued effectivity functions, respectively. Our main results are Theorem 4.17 and Theorem 4.28, which show that the logics P n and TP n are complete with respect to the corresponding classes of Ł n -valued coalitional frames. The key ingredient in the proof of completeness of TP n is the many-valued generalization of filtration technique for neighborhood models [7, Chapter 7.5 ].
Game forms and many-valued effectivity functions
In what follows, S denotes a nonempty set, N = {1, . . . , k} is a finite set and, for any i ∈ N , Σ i denotes a nonempty set. Recall the following definition [1] . Definition 2.1. A game form is a tuple G = (N, {Σ i | i ∈ N }, S, o), where N is a set of players, Σ i is a set of strategies for each i ∈ N , S is a set of outcome states, and o : i∈N Σ i → S is an outcome function.
The game forms are not to be confused with strategic games. While a preference relation over S must be defined for each player i ∈ N in a strategic game [17] , no such requirement exists for a game form. Below we recall the basic examples of game forms. Example 2.2. (i) Let N = {1, 2} and Σ 1 , Σ 2 be some strategy sets. Assume that the players choose their strategies simultaneously. Then we may set S = Σ 1 × Σ 2 and define o as the identity function, which turns ({1, 2},
(ii) Suppose, on the other hand, that Player 2 makes his choice only after observing the strategic choice of Player 1. This sequential procedure is modeled by a game form such that Σ 2 is the set of all functions r : Σ 1 → Σ ′ 2 , where Σ ′ 2 can be viewed as the set of all possible moves that can be played by Player 2. Hence, Σ 2 models the replies of Player 2 to the selection of a strategy by Player 1. The outcome function is given by o(σ 1 , r) = (σ 1 , r(σ 1 )), where (σ 1 , r) ∈ Σ 1 × Σ 2 and the set of outcome states is S = Σ 1 × Σ ′ 2 . An important example is when the outcome function coincides with some social choice correspondence in the sense of [1, Chapter 1]. Example 2.3. Let S ′ be any nonempty set of outcome states and Π(S ′ ) be a set of admissible preference relations on S ′ . In most applications, Π(S ′ ) will be either the set of total preorders (reflexive, transitive, and complete binary relations) or the set of linear orders. A map π : Π(S ′ ) N → PS ′ is called a social choice correspondence. Social choice correspondences implement collective decision procedures mapping a preference profile σ ∈ Π(S ′ ) N of the agents into a set of outcome states that are considered equivalent relatively to σ. If an agent (or a group of agents) wants to enforce a specific outcome, his/her only possible strategy is to declare a preference relation that is likely to bring the collective decision into an outcome π(σ) that contains the desired state. We can describe this scheme as a game form G = (N,
Elements of the powerset PN of N are called coalitions. For every coalition C we denote by C its set-complement in N .
The usual definition [1, 20] of the α-effectivity function E : PN → PPS associated with a game form aims to model the following. For any C ⊆ N and X ⊆ S, we set X ∈ E(C) if a coalition C can choose a joint strategy σ C enforcing the outcome in X no matter what strategies σ C are adopted by the players in C (see Appendix A). We are going to generalize the concept of effectivity function: our goal is to capture the degree to which a coalition C can "enforce" a function f ∈ Ł S n .
where σ C and σ C range in the set of all joint strategies of coalitions C and C, respectively.
The meaning of definition (2.1) is the following: coalition C is effective for f ∈ Ł S n to the degree at most E G (C, f ) ∈ Ł n , disregarding the strategic options of players in opposite coalition C. Note that the usual Boolean α-effectivity function associated with G is exactly the Ł 1 -valued effectivity function of G.
As an example, consider the situation in which we evaluate the capacity of groups of agents to fulfill specified goals. Example 2.5. Let N be the set of the countries of the European Union (EU) and set n = k. Let Σ i be the set of possible policies that country i can adopt at the local (country) level for each i ∈ N . Assume that for every i ∈ N we evaluate the following question:
'Given a global strategy vector σ N , does the economy of country i ∈ N operate at full employment provided that σ N is applied?' This situation can be modeled by a set of states S = PN . The outcome state A ∈ PN means that only the countries in A realize full employment. Experts define the outcome function o : i∈N Σ i → PN by setting i ∈ o(σ N ) if and only if the global strategy σ N leads to a state in which country i ∈ N has reached full employment.
In this setting, an example of a relevant function f ∈ Ł S n can be defined by f (A) = |A| n , where |A| is the cardinality of A ∈ S = PN . For any coalition C, the value E G (C, f ) measures the level with which the countries in C can collaborate to enforce full employment in Europe, regardless of the policies adopted by the countries in C. As another example, consider now that n = lcm(1, . . . , k) and define g C : PN → Ł n by setting g C (A) = |A∩C| |C| for every A, C ∈ PN with C = ∅. Then the value of E G (C, g C ) can be seen as measuring how efficient is coalition C in enforcing full employment in the countries of C (regardless of the result of their strategies in countries in C).
The previous example is just an instance of a more general scheme. Assume that each player in N is trying to achieve his/her own specific goal and that each goal can be partially achieved with a degree of achievement quantified in the scale Ł n . Example 2.6. Given a player set N and the set of strategy spaces {Σ i | i ∈ N }, we consider for each player i ∈ N the utility (payoff) function o i : j∈N Σ j → Ł n . The range of each o i is included in Ł n , which means that we are effectively measuring utility only in a finite scale. This assumption is not, however, too restrictive as many game-theoretic models have been developed in this framework (cf. [13, 15] ). Put o = (o 1 , . . . , o k ) and notice that o is a mapping sending each joint strategy
then becomes a game form. How do coalitions C ⊆ N assess their utility in this scheme? For a sufficiently large n ∈ N, each coalition C can employ an aggregation function f C : Ł N n → Ł n evaluating the total utility realized by C. For example, the average utility f a C and the minimum utility f m C are given by
respectively, where a = (a 1 , . . . , a k ) ∈ Ł N n . For every joint strategy profile (σ C σ C ) ∈ j∈N Σ j , the number f C (o(σ C σ C )) ∈ Ł n is the aggregated utility resulting from the simultaneous choice of the strategic vectors σ C and σ C . Assume that the cooperative outcomes are evaluated by f C : what is the minimum guaranteed utility degree that the coalition C is able to ensure? It is simply the value of effectivity function at (C, f C ), that is,
Adopting the framework of social choice correspondences employed in Example 2.3, we obtain the following kind of many-valued effectivity function.
Example 2.7. Assume now that each state s ∈ S ′ is assigned a utility value u(s) ∈ Ł n . For instance, this value can measure the utility of outcome state s with respect to a criterion that is not under the control of players (the consumption of available resources, say). Then, consider a function A u : PS ′ → Ł n aggregating the utilities u(s) for s ∈ T , where T ∈ PS ′ . Set A u (T ) = max{u(s) | s ∈ T }), for instance. With these definitions, A u ∈ Ł S n and for every C ∈ PN , the value E G (C, A u ) is the minimum guaranteed utility (with regard to u) that coalition C is able to ensure.
Playability of Ł n -valued effectivity functions
Analogously to the classical literature [16, 20] on effectivity functions, we can study the notion of effectivity in a setting independent on game forms. Let S be a set of outcomes and N be a finite player set. We always assume that |S| ≥ 2 and |N | ≥ 2.
Definition 3.1. An Ł n -valued effectivity function is a mapping E : PN × Ł S n → Ł n . Note that the Ł 1 -valued effectivity functions are exactly the effectivity functions PN × {0, 1} S → {0, 1} arising in the Boolean framework [1, 19] . Therefore we call any Ł 1 -valued effectivity function a Boolean effectivity function.
Our goal is to characterize the class of Ł n -valued effectivity functions that are associated with game forms. This characterization is related to the properties of effectivity functions listed in Definition 3.2. We use the following standard notation used in Łukasiewicz logic; see [8] . The set Ł n is equipped with Łukasiewicz interpretation of the implication → and the negation ¬ defined by
respectively, for every x, y ∈ Ł n . Moreover, the strong disjunction ⊕ and the strong conjunction ⊙ are defined by p ⊕ q = ¬p → q and p ⊙ q = ¬(¬p ⊕ ¬q), respectively, and hence they are interpreted in Ł n by the following associative binary operations:
x ⊕ y = min(x + y, 1) and x ⊙ y = max(x + y − 1, 0).
Finally, the connectors ∧ and ∨ are defined as p ∧ q = (q ⊕ ¬p) ⊙ p and p ∨ q = (q ⊙¬p)⊕q, and are interpreted on Ł n as the minimum and the maximum operation, respectively. Definition 3.2. Let E be an Ł n -valued effectivity function. We say that E (1) is outcome monotonic whenever E(C, f ) ≥ E(C, g), for every C ∈ PN and every f, g ∈ Ł S n with f ≥ g;
) for every C ∈ PN and every f ∈ Ł S n ; (7) has liveness property if E(C, 1) = 1 for every C ∈ PN ; (8) has safety property if E(C, 0) = 0 for every C ∈ PN ;
g}. We say that E playable whenever it is outcome monotonic, N -maximal, superadditive, homogeneous, and has liveness and safety properties. We say that E is truly playable if it is playable and principal.
If n = 1, then the definitions of (truly) playable Boolean effectivity function coincide with the corresponding definitions used in the Boolean setting [19, 9] ; see also Appendix A.
Note that if E is an outcome monotonic and homogeneous Ł n -valued effectivity function, then E(C, −) −1 (1) is an MV-filter of the MV-algebra Ł S n [8] . Moreover, the Ł n -valued effectivity function E is principal whenever the MV-filter E(∅, −) −1 (1) is principal.
It may be difficult to get some intuition about the definition of a homogeneous Ł n -valued effectivity function in the game form framework. We refer to Remark 4.18 for an equivalent formulation of this definition. The following result illustrates that homogeneity arises naturally in the context of game forms. For every set Y ⊆ S, we denote by χ Y the characteristic function of Y .
is a game form, then E G is a truly playable Ł n -valued effectivity function.
Proof. It follows directly from Definition 2.4 that E G is outcome monotonic, Nmaximal and has liveness and safety properties. Homogeneity of E G follows from the fact that the maps τ ⊕ : x → x⊕x and τ ⊙ :
The conclusion follows from the fact that the latter is upper bounded by
As the next result shows, a Boolean effectivity function can be associated with any homogeneous Ł n -valued effectivity function. The Boolean algebra Ł S 1 = {0, 1} S is called the Boolean skeleton of Ł S n . In other words, the Boolean skeleton of Ł S n is the powerset of S if we identify the subsets of S with their characteristic functions on S. An element f ∈ Ł S n belongs to the Boolean skeleton of Ł S n if and only if f ⊕ f = f , and such an element is said to be idempotent. For every Ł n -valued effectivity function E :
Proof. For any idempotent element f ∈ Ł S n and for every C ∈ PN , we obtain
Therefore E ♯ is a Boolean effectivity function.
If in addition E is playable (respectively, truly playable), then it satisfies conditions (1), (2), (4), (7) and (8) (respectively, conditions (1), (2), (4), (7) , (8) and (9)) of Definition 3.2. It follows that E ♯ also satisfies the analogous Boolean conditions (see Appendix A) since they do not involve any existential quantifier over the elements of Ł S n . In order to study the playability property, we need more technical preliminaries. To this end, put
Definition 3.5. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We denote by τi /n a mapping Ł n → Ł n such that (1) τi /n is a finite multiple composition of the maps τ ⊕ and τ ⊙ , (2) the following equality holds:
A constructive proof of the existence of τi /n appears in [18] .
Any mapping τ : Ł n → Ł n can be composed with any f ∈ Ł S n . Thus τ (f )(s) = τ (f (s)) for every s ∈ S and f ∈ Ł S n . Lemma 3.6. Let E, E ′ : PN × Ł S n → Ł n be homogeneous Ł n -valued effectivity functions.
Proof. Necessity if trivial. To prove sufficiency assume that
The following lemma is straightforward. Its statement uses the notion of Boolean effectivity function H G associated with a game form G, which is recalled in Appendix A.
Lemma 3.7. Let G be a game form. If H G and E G are the Boolean and the Ł n -valued effectivity function associated with G, respectively, then H G = E ♯ G . For any r ∈ [0, 1], we denote by ⌈r⌉ the element min{a ∈ Ł n | a ≥ r}. The following lemma will turn out to be crucial for understanding the limits of expressive power of the language associated with (truly) playable effectivity functions; see Proposition 4.8.
Proof. Clearly E ♯ = H. It follows from outcome monotonicity of H that E is outcome monotonic. Since H satisfies liveness and safety, so does the function E. To prove that E is supperadditive, assume on the contrary that there exist f, g ∈ Ł S n and C,
On the one hand, it follows that H(C ∪ D, τi /n (f ) ∧ τi /n (g)) = H(C ∪ D, τi /n (f ∧ g)) = 0. On the other hand, we obtain H(C, τi /n (f )) = H(D, τi /n (g)) = 1 and by supperadditivity of H we get H(C ∪ D, τi /n (f ) ∧ τi /n (g)) = 1, a contradiction.
Using again the definition of E, the latter is equivalent to E(C, f ) ≥ ⌈ i 2n ⌉, which is the same as E(C, f ) ⊕ E(C, f ) ≥ i n . We can proceed in a similar way to prove that
is an MV-filter of Ł S n and g is idempotent. The following result, which is the Ł n -valued generalization of [ 
It is useful to introduce a weaker notion of playability.
n and every coalition C = N , if E has liveness and safety property for coalitions C = N , and if it satisfies superadditivity for coalitions C 1 and C 2 such that C 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅ and C 1 ∪ C 2 = N . Lemma 3.11. If E is a playable Ł n -valued effectivity function, then E is coalition monotonic and regular.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction to prove that E is regular. Assume that there
Since E is homogeneous, it follows that E(C, τi /n (f )) = 1 and E(C, τj /n (¬f )) = 1. Thus we obtain by superadditivity E(N, τi /n (f )∧τj /n (¬f )) = 1, which contradicts the safety property since τi /n (f ) ∧ τj /n (¬f ) = 0.
We prove that E is coalition monotonic. Let C ⊆ C ′ ∈ PN and f ∈ Ł S n . By applying superadditivity to C 1 = C and Proof. The first implication follows from Lemma 3.11. Conversely, assume that E is semi-playable, homogeneous, regular and N -maximal. First we prove superadditivity. Let C ∈ PN with C = N . We have to verify that E(C, f ) ∧ E(C, g) ≤ E(N, f ∧ g). By way of contradiction, assume that there is i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that E(N, f ∧ g) < i n ≤ E(C, f ) ∧ E(C, g). Since E is homogeneous, we obtain E(C, τ i/n (f )) = 1 = E(C, τ i/n (g)), while, by N -maximality, E(∅, ¬τ i/n (f ∧ g)) = 1. It follows from superadditivity that E(C, τ i/n (f )∧¬τ i/n (f ∧g)) = 1, which is equiva-
From the fact that τ i/n (f ) and τ i/n (g) belong to the Boolean skeleton of Ł S n we deduce E(C, τ i/n (f ) ∧ ¬τ i/n (g)) = 1. We conclude that E(C, ¬τ i/n (g)) = 1 by outcome monotonicity and finally that E(C, τ i/n (g)) = 0 by regularity, which is the desired contradiction.
It is easy to check that liveness and safety conditions are satisfied for C = N . Moreover, E is N -maximal and homogeneous by assumption. It remains to prove that E is outcome monotonic. If f ≤ g ∈ Ł S n , we obtain successively
where the first inequality is obtained by regularity, the second by monotonicity and the third by N -maximality.
Ł n -valued modal language and semantics for effectivity functions
In this section we build a many-valued modal logic with neighborhood semantics in the spirit of [19, 9] that capture the properties of (truly) playable Ł n -valued effectivity functions. The set L of formulas is defined inductively from the countably infinite set Prop of propositional variables by the following rules:
where p ∈ Prop and C ∈ PN . We use 0 as an abbreviation of ¬1. The intended reading of the formula [C]φ is 'coalition C can enforce an outcome state in which φ holds'. We introduce a semantics for L which is based on a class of action models called Ł n -valued L-frames. Such frames are Ł n -valued extensions of coalition frames introduced in [19] . The coalition frames are a very general model of interaction in which an effectivity function over the player set N is associated with each outcome state in S. Under the assumption of true playability, this is equivalent to specifying a game form for every outcome state in S.
For every Ł n -valued L-model M, the valuation map Val is extended inductively to S× L by setting for every C ∈ PN and every φ, ψ ∈ L . We use the standard notation and terminology. We say that a formula φ is true in M = (F, Val) and write M |= φ if Val(u, φ) = 1 for every u ∈ S. A formula φ is valid in an Ł n -valued L-frame F if it is true in every Ł n -valued L-model based on F.
In order to proceed further, we need to generalize the technique of filtration [7, Chapter 7.5] for neighborhood models. 
We denote by |S| the set of equivalence classes |u| for ≡ Γ . An Ł n -valued L-model M * = (|S|, E * , Val * ) is a Γ-filtration of M if the following conditions are satisfied for every u ∈ S:
(1) Val * (|u|, p) = Val(u, p) for every p ∈ Prop ∩ Γ, In what follows we focus on the relations between the language L and the Ł nvalued L-frames in which the effectivity functions are (truly) playable.
Our first aim is to prove that, similarly as in the Boolean case [9] , there is no set of L-formulas that can define truly playable Ł n -valued L-frames inside the class of playable Ł n -valued L-frames. To this end, we show that for any playable Ł n -valued L-model M and any formula φ, there is a finite playable Ł n -valued L-model M φ such that M |= φ if and only if M φ |= φ. We use this property and the fact that finite playable Ł n -valued L-models are truly playable to prove Proposition 4.8. The construction of M φ is based on a refinement of filtration for playable Ł n -valued Lmodels. We proceed in two steps. The next definition constitutes the first step in this direction. and C = N is a coalition, then
which shows that E * (|u|) ♯ is a Boolean effectivity function. We prove that E * (|u|) ♯ is regular and semi-playable (see Definition 3.10). It is straightforward to show that E * (|u|) ♯ (C, −) is monotonic and satisfies liveness and safety for every coalition C = N . Moreover, N -maximality holds for E * (|u|) ♯ according to (4.7).
Let us prove superadditivity for coalitions C, D such that C ∩D = ∅ and C ∪D = N . If f, g ∈ Ł |S| 1 , then E * (|u|)(C, f ) ∧ E * (|u|)(D, g) is by definition equal to the maximum of the values E(u)(C, Val(−, ψ))∧E(u)(D, Val(−, ρ)), where ψ and ρ run through the elements of Cl(µ) satisfying |Val(−, ψ)| ≤ f and |Val(−, ρ)| ≤ g. By superadditivity of E we have
for every formula ψ and ρ. Thus it follows from the definition of E * that
which is the sought result.
It remains to prove that for every C ∈ PN and every f ∈ Ł |S| 1
such that E * (|u|)(C, f ) = 1, we have E * (|u|)(C, ¬f ) = 0. By condition (4.7), we may assume that C = N . Suppose for the sake of contradiction that E * (|u|)(C, ¬f ) = 1. By (4.6) it means that there are some ψ, ρ ∈ Cl(µ) such that |Val(−, ψ)| ≤ f and |Val(−, ρ)| ≤ ¬f , and E(u)(C, Val(−, ψ)) = E(u)(C, Val(−, ρ)) = 1. By supperadditivity of E, we obtain E(N, Val(−, ψ ∧ ρ)) = 1 with ψ ∧ ρ ∈ Cl(µ) satisfying |Val(−, ψ ∧ ρ)| ≤ f ∧ ¬f . By (4.6), (4.7), Definition 4.2 (2) , N -maximality of E and the fact that f ∈ Ł |S| 1 , we obtain E * (|u|)(N, 0) = 1. This is a contradiction since E * (|u|)(N, 0) = ¬E * (|u|)(∅, 1) = 0 by (4.7) and liveness of E * for the empty coalition.
We combine Lemma 4.6 together with Lemma 3.8 to construct Cl(µ)-filtrations that preserve playability. The next result shows that the gain of expressive power induced by the manyvalued nature of L and of its associated semantics is not enough to single out those playable L-models that are truly playable. Proof. Assume that there exists a set Λ of L-formulas such that a playable Ł nvalued L-frame F is truly playable if and only if every formula of Λ is valid in F.
Let F be a playable Ł n -valued L-frame which is not truly playable. The existence of such F is a consequence of Lemma 3.8 applied to the effectivity function E defined in [9, Proposition 4] . For every φ ∈ Λ and every model M based on F, Proposition 4.7 provides a playable Cl(φ)-filtration M + . Since M + has a finite set of outcome states, it is truly playable. It follows from the definition of Λ that M + |= φ and from Lemma 4.3 that M |= φ. We have proved that every formula of Λ is true in every model based on F and we conclude that F is truly playable, which is the desired contradiction. 4.2. Ł n -valued playable logic for finite playable Ł n -valued L-frames. Proposition 4.8 says that L is not adequate for capturing the properties of Ł n -valued effectivity functions associated with game forms. Indeed, this language is not even expressive enough to distinguish between the playable and the truly playable Ł nvalued L-frames. Nevertheless, when the set of outcome states S is finite, every playable Ł n -valued effectivity function is truly playable and it turns out that playability can be encoded by L-formulas; see our completeness result, Theorem 4.17. We start with axiomatizing the properties of playable Ł n -valued effectivity functions. Definition 4.9. An Ł n -valued playable logic is a subset L of L which is closed under Modus Ponens, Uniform Substitution and Monotonicity (if φ → ψ ∈ L, then [C]φ → [C]ψ ∈ L for every C ∈ PN ) and that contains an axiomatic base of Łukasiewicz (n + 1)-valued logic (see [10] or [8, Section 8.5]) together with the following axioms:
The axioms of Ł n -valued playable logic
We denote by P n the smallest Ł n -valued playable logic, that is, the intersection of all the Ł n -valued playable logics. We conform with common usage and we often write ⊢ Pn φ instead of φ ∈ P n .
The axioms (1)-(5) together with the Monotonicity rule reflect the properties defining playability. In Remark 4.18 at the end of this section, we give equivalent and more intuitive axioms that can replace (1)-(2) in the axiomatizatin of P n .
The following lemma can be proved by a standard induction argument. We will prove completeness of P n with respect to the class of playable Ł n -valued L-models. Our proof is based on the construction of the canonical model.
4.2.1.
Construction of the canonical model. Let us denote by F Pn the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of P n , that is, the quotient of L under the syntactic equivalence and every φ, ψ ∈ L (these definitions are meaningful because P n is closed under Equivalence). By abuse of notation, we denote the class φ/ ≡ by φ.
Since P n contains every tautology of Łukasiewicz n+1-valued logic, the {→, ¬, 1}reduct of F Pn is an MV-algebra that belongs to the variety MV n generated by Ł n .
In the Boolean setting, one of the key ingredients of the construction of the canonical model is the ultrafilter theorem that allows us to separate by an ultrafilter any two different non-top elements of a Boolean algebra B. We can rephrase this separation result using the bijective correspondence between the ultrafilters of B and the homomorphisms of B into the two-element Boolean algebra 2: for every a = b ∈ B \ {1}, there is a homomorphism u : B → 2 such that u(a) = 1 and u(b) = 0. The variety MV n has an analogous property [8] . This separation property explains our choice of the set
of {¬, →, 1}-homomorphisms from F Pn to Ł n as the universe of the canonical model of P n .
We will use the following technique to associate an Ł n -valued effectivity function E c (u) with every u ∈ W c . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we will define a subset P i of PN × W c × Ł W c n , such that P 1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ P n . Then we will safely set
We use the convention P 0 = PN × W c × Ł W c n . Lemma 4.13. The inclusion P i ⊆ P i−1 holds for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. Assume that φ satisfies the condition defining P i in (4.8) for C, f , u and i > 0 and put ρ = τi /n (φ).
and where Val c is defined by First, assume E c (u) C, Val c (−, ψ) ≥ i n . Then, by (4.11) and (4.8), there is ρ ∈ L such that u([C]ρ) ≥ i n and Val c (v, ψ) ≥ i n for any v ∈ W c satisfying v(ρ) ≥ i n . By induction hypothesis, it means that for every v ∈ W c with v(ρ) ≥ i n , we have v(ψ) ≥ i n . It follows that v τi /n (ρ) → τi /n (ψ) = 1 for every v ∈ W c . This yields ⊢ Pn τi /n (ρ) → τi /n (ψ) since the {→, ¬, 1}-reduct of F Pn has the separation property (Lemma 4.11). As P n is closed under Monotonicity, we obtain
By axioms (1) and (2) of P n (Definition 4.9) and Uniform Substitution, this is equivalent to
We obtain (C, u, Val(−, ψ)) ∈ P i by induction hypothesis and by considering φ = ψ in the definition (4.8) of P i . This proves (4.12).
Finally, assume µ = [N ]ψ for some ψ ∈ L . We will prove
Indeed, on the one hand we obtain
by (4.9), which is in turn equal to u(¬[∅]¬ψ) by induction hypothesis and the first part of this proof. Axiom (5) 
To prove the converse inequality, let us assume for the sake of contradiction that there is i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that E c (u)(N, Val(−, ψ)) < i n = u([N ]ψ). Therefore u([N ]τ i/n (ψ)) = 1, while E c (u)(∅, Val(−, ¬τ i/n (ψ)) = 1 by (4.9). It follows from this identity that u([∅]¬τi /n (ψ)) = 1 by induction hypothesis and the first part of the proof. From axiom (7) applied with C = N and C ′ = ∅ we get u([N ] τi /n (ψ) ∧ ¬τi /n (ψ)) = 1; however, this is in contradiction with axiom (4) since τi /n (ψ) ∧ ¬τi /n (ψ) = 0.
4.2.2.
Completeness result for P n . In order to use the canonical model for the proof of completeness of P n with respect to the class of the playable Ł n -valued L-models, we need the following result. Proof. Let u ∈ W c . It suffices to prove that E c (u) is semi-playable, homogeneous, N -maximal and regular. It is easily checked that E c (u)(C, −) is monotonic for every coalition C = N . The property of N -maximality is obtained by (4.9).
For homogeneity, let C = N ∈ PN and f ∈ Ł W c n . We will prove that for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
for every v satisfying v(ρ) ≥ i 2n . On the one hand, by axioms (1) and (2) of P n and considering
The definition of E c yields a formula ρ such that u([C]ρ) ≥ i n and f (v) ≥ i 2n for any v ∈ W c with v(ρ) ≥ i n . By considering φ = τ i/n (ρ), we obtain on the one hand that
This finishes the proof of (4.13).
Analogously, we can show that
Employing N -maximality and the first part of the proof, it is easy to prove that for every
Let us prove that E c (u) has safety property for C = N . By way of contradiction, assume that E c (u)(C, 0) ≥ 1 n . There is a formula φ such that u([C]φ) ≥ 1 n and v(φ) = 0 for every v ∈ W c . We deduce that ⊢ Pn φ → 0 and hence ⊢ Pn [C]φ → [C]0 by Monotonicity. It follows that 1 n ≤ u([C]φ) ≤ u([C]0) = 0, a contradiction. To prove that E c (u) has liveness property for every C = N , it suffices to consider φ = 1 in (4.8) in order to show (C, u, 1) ∈ P 1 .
We have to prove coalition monotonicity for C 1 and C 2 such that C 1 ∩C 2 = ∅ and
Thus we can consider φ = φ 1 ∧φ 2 in (4.8) to get (C 1 ∪C 2 , u, f 1 ∧f 2 ) ∈ P i . It remains to check that E c (u) is regular. By (4.9), it suffices to prove that it is C-regular for every C = N . For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that ¬E c (u)(C, ¬f ) < i n ≤ E c (u)(C, f ). It follows that E c (u)(C, τi /n (f )) = 1, while E c (u)(C, τj /n (¬f )) = 1 for j n = 1 − i−1 n . By superadditivity, we obtain E c (u)(N, τi /n (f ) ∧ τj /n (¬f )) = 1, which is a contradiction since τi /n (f ) ∧ τj /n (¬f ) is the constant map 0. (1) ⊢ Pn φ.
(2) φ is true in every playable Ł n -valued L-model. Remark 4.18. We can use the formulas τi /n (p) to replace axioms (1) and (2) of P n (Definition 4.9) by a family of axioms, which are easier to understand. Indeed, put
It follows from the definition of an Ł n -valued playable logic that B ⊆ P n . A careful analysis of the proofs of Lemma 4.13, Proposition 4.15, Lemma 4.16 and Theorem 4.17 shows that we have only used the axioms in A in the form of substitutions in formulas of B. Denote by P ′ n the smallest set of formulas that contains an axiomatic base of Łukasiewicz logic, the set B, and that is closed under Modus Ponens, Uniform Substitution and Monotonicity. It follows from the previous observation that for any φ ∈ L we have ⊢ P ′ n φ if and only if M |= φ for every playable Ł n -valued L-model. It results that P ′ n = P n . Thus the set of axioms A can be equivalently replaced by B. Informally speaking, the content of axioms (1)-(2) of P n is rephrased below.
For any i ≤ n, the following two assertions are equivalent:
• The truth value of the statement 'coalition C can enforce an outcome state in which φ holds' is at least i n . • Coalition C can enforce an outcome state in which the truth value of φ is at least i n . 4.3. Ł n -valued truly playable logics for truly playable Ł n -valued L + -frames. Theorem 4.17 says that P n is the logic of playable rather than truly playable effectivity functions. Moreover, by Proposition 4.8 there is no axiomatization of truly playable effectivity functions in the language L. Thus the presented many-valued approach is a faithful generalization of the Boolean framework; see [9] . In fact the authors of [9] go beyond this limitation of the Boolean setting by adding a new connective to L and by enriching the neighborhood semantics with a Kripke relation. We follow this idea by designing the modal equivalent of truly playable Ł n -valued effectivity functions.
Let
is unary. The set L + of formulas is defined inductively from the countably infinite set Prop of propositional variables by the following rules:
where p ∈ Prop and C ∈ PN .
In order to interpret L + -formulas, we enrich the Ł n -valued L-frames with a binary relation. In an Ł n -valued L + -model, the valuation map Val is extended inductively to S× L + by using rules (4.1) -(4.3) for the connectors 1, ¬ and →, by using rule (4.4) for the connectors [C], where C ∈ PN , and by putting (4.14) Val
for any φ ∈ L + and u ∈ S. It turns out that the class of standard truly playable Ł n -valued L + -frames can be defined inside the class of standard playable Ł n -valued L + -frames by an L + -formula. The next assertion is the Ł n -valued generalization of [9, Proposition 14] . 
Since F ♯ is truly playable by [9, Proposition 14] , F is truly playable as well.
We have to adapt the filtration technique to fit in with the newly introduced language L + . The next definition merges , where C ∈ PN , and such that L contains an axiomatic base of Łukasiewicz (n + 1)-valued logic together with axioms (1)-(5) of logic P n and the following axioms:
The additional axioms of Ł n -valued truly playble logic
We denote by TP n the smallest Ł n -valued truly playable logic.
Contrary to the Boolean case, it is not known if axiom (8) can be removed from the axiomatization of TP n without changing TP n . Nevertheless, the following result holds true. Proof. Let ⊢ TP n φ. Then ⊢ TP n 1 → φ and ⊢ TP n [∅]1 → [∅]φ by Monotonicity, which is equivalent to ⊢ TPn [O]1 → [O]φ by axiom (7) . The conclusion follows from axiom (6) and Modus Ponens.
We prove completeness of TP n with respect to the standard truly playable Ł nvalued L + -models by the technique of the canonical model. We denote by F TP n the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of TP n . Proof. By Proposition 4.7 we know that M is playable. As M is finite, it is truly playable. By Proposition 4.7 and by definition of R * , the model M + is a Cl(µ)filtration of M in the sense of Definition 4.21.
It remains to prove that M + is standard. First, assume that u, v ∈ W c and E + (|u|)(∅, ¬χ {|v|} ) = 0. It follows from the definition of E + and E * that
for every φ ∈ Cl(µ) such that Val(v, φ) = 0. We conclude that (|u|, |v|) ∈ R * by the definition of R * .
Let E(|u|, |v|) ∈ R * . We will prove that E + (|u|)(∅, ¬χ {|v|} ) = 0. By way of contradiction, assume that there is φ ∈ Cl(µ) such that Val(v, φ) = 0 and
Since χ {|v|} is idempotent and E(u) is homogeneous, we may assume i = n. It follows from Definition 4.19 and Proposition 4.26 that u([∅]φ) = 1. By axiom (7) of TP n , we deduce u([O]φ) = 1. The last identity is a contradiction since (|u|, |v|) ∈ R * and v(φ) = 0.
Theorem 4.28 (Completeness of TP n ). For any φ ∈ L + , the following assertions are equivalent:
(1) ⊢ TPn φ.
(2) φ is true in every standard truly playable Ł n -valued L + -model.
(3) φ is true in every finite standard playable Ł n -valued L + -model.
Proof. It is clear that (2) =⇒ (3). Moreover, (1) =⇒ (2) can be proved by a straightforward induction argument. To prove (2) =⇒ (1), we obtain by Proposition 4.27 and Proposition 4.26 that φ is true in the canonical model of TP n , which means ⊢ TPn φ.
Conclusions and future research
In this paper we have studied some generalizations of Pauly's Coalition Logic in a modal extension of Łukasiewicz logic. We believe that these generalizations could prove vital for the logical treatment of problems arising in game theory and social choice. Below we list some ideas for possible applications and topics for further investigations.
(1) The gain of expressive power owing to the used many-valued modal language could be exploited to encode some properties of strategic or voting games, such as, for instance, the distribution of power among coalitions in weighted voting games. (2) In modal extensions of (n + 1)-valued Łukasiewicz logics, two types of relational structures can naturally be considered, giving rise to two types of completeness results [12] . On the one hand, there is the class of frames (structures with binary accessibility relations), while, on the other hand, there is the class of Ł n -valued frames. The latter are frames in which the set of allowed truth values in a world is a prescribed subalgebra of Ł n for every world of the frame. Such a prescription could also be considered in the context of Ł n -valued (truly) playable logics, where the neighborhood semantics replace the relational ones. The possible aim is to obtain new completeness results with respect to this enriched semantics. (3) We have based our generalizations of Coalition Logic on modal extensions of Łukasiewicz logic. Other families of many-valued logics could be considered as a basis for many-valued versions of Coalition Logic. For example, it would be interesting to compare expressive power between the language developed in this paper and a many-valued coalitional language based on modal extensions of Gödel logics [14] . (4) Coalition Logic is among many formal calculi developed to model the deductive aspects of games. Other systems have been considered, such as ATL [4, 3] and its epistemic extensions [23] . A natural task could be to design the many-valued versions of those calculi in order to capture wider classes of games or protocols in which errors are allowed; see [21] , for instance.
Appendix A. Boolean effectivity functions and their representation
In this appendix we summarize the results about Boolean effectivity functions and their representation by game forms as investigated in [20, 19, 9] . Let N be a player set and S be a set of outcomes. Recall Definition 2.1: a game form is a tuple G = (N, {Σ i | i ∈ N }, S, o), where Σ i is a set of strategies for each player i ∈ N and o : i∈N Σ i → S is an outcome function. The effectivity function H G : PN → PPS of a game form G is defined as follows:
X ∈ H G (C) if there exists σ C such that for every σ C , o(σ C σ C ) ∈ X.
In words, the condition X ∈ H G (C) is true whenever the coalition C has the power to enforce an outcome to lie in X. The interested reader is referred to [19, 1] for a discussion and examples of effectivity functions in game theory and social choice.
More generally and without any reference to game forms, any mapping E : PN → PPS is called an effectivity function. Note that we may equivalently view the mapping PN → PPS as PN ×{0, 1} S → {0, 1}. The notion of truly playable effectivity function was introduced by Goranko et al. [9] in order to fix the error in Pauly's characterization result [19, Theorem 3.2] . Roughly speaking, the problems arise from the existence of Pauly's playable effectivity functions that are not generated by game forms over infinite sets of outcomes. We collect the the basic notions and results concerning truly playable functions. The following properties of effectivity functions are considered in [19] and [9, Definition 3].
Definition A.1. Let E : PN → PPS be an effectivity function. We say that E
(1) is superadditive if C 1 ∩ C 2 = ∅ and X ∈ E(C 1 ), Y ∈ E(C 2 ) imply that X ∩ Y ∈ E(C 1 ∪ C 2 ), for every C 1 , C 2 ∈ PN ; (2) is outcome monotonic if X ∈ E(C) and X ⊆ Y imply Y ∈ E(C), for every C ∈ PN ; (3) is N -maximal if X / ∈ E(∅) implies X ∈ E(N ); (4) has liveness property if ∅ / ∈ E(C), for every C ∈ PN ; (5) has safety property if S ∈ E(C), for every C ∈ PN . We call E playable whenever (1)-(5) are satisfied.
We will prove that the characterization of effectivity functions generated by game forms from [9, Theorem 1] can be obtained as a consequence of Peleg's Theorem 3.5* in [20] . Let N = {1, . . . , k} be a finite set of players with k ≥ 2 and S be a (possibly infinite) set of outcomes such that |S| ≥ 2. A family B ⊆ PS that contains S is called a structure on S. An effectivity function E : PN → PPS is said to be compatible with a structure B on S if E(C) ⊆ B for every C ∈ PN , E has liveness and safety properties, E(∅) = {S}, and E(N ) = B \ {∅}. We say that B is closed under finite intersections if X 1 , . . . , X j ∈ B implies j i=1 X i ∈ B for every j ∈ N. An effectivity function is outcome monotonic w.r.t. B when the following implication holds true: if X ∈ E(C), X ⊆ Y and Y ∈ B, then Y ∈ E(C), for every C ∈ PN . Definition A.3. Let E : PN → PPS be an effectivity function. We say that E is truly playable if it is playable and E(∅) is a principal filter in PS.
Since every filter on a finite set is principal, the class of truly playable functions and that of playable functions coincide provided that S is finite. The following result, which was originally proved in [ Proof. As for the first implication, it is easy to see that H G is playable. Set Z = {z ∈ S | z = o(σ N ) for some strategy profile σ N }. Then Z ∈ H G (∅). Clearly, for any set of outcomes X ⊆ S we have X ∈ H G (∅) if and only if X contains the "range" Z . This means that H G (∅) is the principal filter generated by Z and H G is truly playable. In order to show the converse implication, let E be truly playable and put Z = E(∅). Since E satisfies safety, Z = ∅, and since E(∅) is a principal filter, E(∅) = {X ∈ PS | Z ⊆ X}. Consider the mapping E ′ : PN → PPZ defined as follows:
X ∈ E ′ (C) if X ∈ E(C), for every X ∈ PZ and every C ∈ PN .
We claim that E ′ is compatible with the structure PZ on Z. Indeed, it follows that E ′ (∅) = {Z} and E ′ (C) ⊆ PZ \ {∅} for every C ∈ PN . By monotonicity, Z ∈ E ′ (C) for every C ∈ PN . It remains to prove that PZ \ {∅} ⊆ E(N ). Let ∅ = X ⊆ Z. If X = Z, then we already know that X ∈ E(N ). Otherwise, X is a nonempty proper subset of Z and thus X / ∈ E(∅). We obtain by N -maximality of E that X ∈ E(N ) and by superadditivity that X ∩ Z ∈ E(N ). We have proved that the complement in Z of any nonempty proper subset of Z is in E(N ), which yields PZ \ {∅} ⊆ E(N ). We can conclude that E ′ (N ) = PZ \ {∅}.
By Theorem A.2, there is a game form G ′ = (N, {Σ i | i ∈ N }, Z, o) such that E ′ = H G ′ . Put G = (N, {Σ i | i ∈ N }, S, o). We will show that E = H G . To this end, let C ∈ PN and X ∈ E(C). By superadditivity, X ∩ Z ∈ E(C), therefore X ∩ Z ∈ E ′ (C) = H G ′ (C). By the definition of H G ′ and H G , we get X ∈ H G (C). For the converse inclusion H G ⊆ E, assume that X ∈ PS belongs to H G (C). By the definition of H G , there exists σ C such that o(σ C σ C ) ∈ X ∩ Z for every σ C . This means X ∩ Z ∈ H G ′ (C) = E ′ (C), which gives X ∩ Z ∈ E(C). Finally, X ∈ E(C) follows from outcome monotonicity.
